Friday, August 22, 2014

Death Rate

Worldwide, a recent year's gun related homicides totaled 127,607.

Worldwide following the Great Recession (meltdown), the deaths caused by Wall Street, et. al., totaled 900,000+  just in eastern Africa and just the first year.

Worldwide civilian owned guns, 644,008,400.
Wall Street business employees, 165,200 if you count them all.

Do the math.
Wall Street employees are 926.37 times more deadly than guns and gun owners.
If you count just the decision makers, they're 10,000+ times more likely to kill someone than a gun owner, criminal or otherwise.

The recession events brought the deadly nature of national and international finance practices to our attention.  The world-wide impact continues unabated and more broadly than just the single recession event.

"We have learned that the largest financial institutions are a dagger pointed at the heart of our economy." A recent New York Times editorial noted that, regarding the controversies surrounding JPMorgan Chase, “the underlying problem is not only this or that violation, but the fact that the sheer size and scope and complexity of the banking behemoths defy controls, encouraging speculation and bad behavior.”
We would add undermining free-market capitalism and nearly bankrupting the United States. ...
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas analysis of the 2007-09 financial crisis and its aftermath estimates the cost in the range of $15 trillion-$30 trillion, or $50,000 to $100,000 per American citizen. One to five years of output produced by 310 million U.S. citizens is down the drain. 
At the center of these horrific losses are the “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) behemoths. The Dodd-Frank act claims to end TBTF. Instead, it entrenches the TBTF pathology. Since its enactment, the giants have gotten bigger and the profitability of community and regional banks that might have posed more meaningful competition has been undermined by its complexity.

There is a tenable alternative: Government policy should require that giant banking institutions restructure and streamline their disparate operations into separately owned companies, less complex and opaque, and more manageable and focused.
Lesser actions are incapable of altering the unacceptable status quo or providing for a credible regime shift. For example, higher capital requirements (or decreases in permitted “leverage ratios”) may provide temporary confidence in the capital strength of TBTF institutions, but they offer false security. In a financial panic with liquidity runs, enhanced capital cushions cannot ultimately stem a crisis of confidence and outflows of funds.
The only workable solution is to downsize and devolve the TBTF banking entities into units that the FDIC would label “Too Small to Save,” just like the other 99.8 percent of U.S. banks."
From WSJ and Dallas Federal Reserve Bank articles by RICHARD W. FISHER and HARVEY ROSENBLUM